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Abstract
Development practitioners in the West have proclaimed that an increas-
ing “feminization of agriculture” is occurring in the developing world. In
this paper, I use household survey data collected in rural China to empiri-
cally test whether or not women have been doing an increasing amount of
farmwork. I ﬁnd exactly the opposite: if anything, the proportion of farm-
work being done by women is declining over the late 1990s. Furthermore, I
ﬁnd that the future feminization of agriculture in China is unlikely.
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Development practitioners in the West have proclaimed that an increasing
“feminization of agriculture” is occurring in the developing world. Publications
by the FAO, the World Bank, the US Agency for International Development, and
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) have all
recently proclaimed that women are doing an increasing proportion of farmwork
in the developing world, and that policies should be designed to account for the
feminization of agriculture (FAO, 2003; Buvini´ c, Gwin, and Bates, 1996; World
Bank, 2002; Simmons, 2002; CGIAR, 2003). Yet, as some of these agencies
or authors note, there is little empirical support for a feminization of agriculture
hypothesis (e.g. Buvini´ c et al., 1996).
These studies and others (e.g. Mehra and Gammage, 1999) base statements
about the feminization of agriculture largely on aggregated data published by the
United Nations that indicate women’s participation in agriculture and presence in
rural areas fell more slowly than men in China, sub-Sarahan Africa, and South
Asia between 1970 and 1990 (UN, 1995). However, these data do not prove a
feminization of agriculture, as the men left in rural areas could work increasingly
longer hours than women. Surprisingly, to my knowledge no one has used mi-
croeconomic data to test whether or not women are doing an increasing amount
of farmwork anywhere in the developing world.
From a theoretical perspective, two stories are consistent with women doing
an increasing proportion of farmwork. If one assumes that separate off-farm la-
bor markets exist for men and women, then an increasing wage for men relative
to women would drive up the proportion of agricultural labor done by women;
hence, a feminization of agriculture (e.g. Boserup, 1970). Alternatively, barriers
to off-farm entry could be different for men and women, and loosening barriers
for men relative to women would also increase the proportion of farmwork done
by women. In West Africa, where men and women in rural areas farm separate
plots (e.g. Doss, 1996; Goldstein and Udry, 1999) one could potentially test for
the feminization of agriculture by testing whether net transfers of land from men
to women were occurring over time. Elsewhere, one would ideally ﬁnd a place
with functioning off-farm labor markets in order to test whether or not agriculture
is being feminized.
In this paper, I will use household survey data to empirically test whether or
not agriculture is being feminized in rural China. China makes a nice case study
in which to test for the feminization of agriculture for several reasons. First, there
is anecdotal and descriptive evidence that agriculture is being feminized in China.
1Judd (1990) and Song and Jiggins (2000) both describe women as taking over
farming in speciﬁc villages. Jacka (1997) quotes county ofﬁcials in Sichuan as
describing a feminization of the agricultural labor force. Additionally, Rawski
and Mead (1998) show provincial aggregate trends suggest that women are taking
over farmwork in China. Second, much of the country’s labor force still resides in
rural areas. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2002), more than 60%
of China’s labor force works in rural areas. Finally, China has the right conditions
for the feminization of agriculture to be occurring; several authors have detailed
growing off-farm labor markets within China (e.g. Parish, Zhe, and Li, 1995;
Rozelle et al., 1999; de Brauw et al., 2002) that other authors argue are still quite
constrained (e.g. Yang and Zhou, 1996; Mallee, 2000). Speciﬁcally, migration
is growing rapidly in China, taking laborers out of rural areas where they could
continue to work in farming (e.g. Johnson, 1999). Traditionally, authors argue
that the feminization of agriculture occurs as a corollary to industrialization, as
men leave the farm to seek industrial, urban jobs (Boserup, 1970). The conﬂu-
ence of anecdotal evidence, a large proportion of the labor force in agriculture,
and growing migration make China an ideal place to test for the feminization of
agriculture.
In contrast to the anecdotal and descriptive evidence, I will use a variety of
empirical methods to argue that agriculture is not being feminized in rural China.
To initially investigate the gender composition of the agricultural labor force in
China, I will use a retrospective data set collected in late 2000 to show that the
percentage of farmwork being provided by women is constant at best, or even
decreasing over the late 1990s. I will conﬁrm these ﬁndings by comparing cross-
sectional data sets collected in 1995 and 2000 in northeast China. The results of
these exercises will show that if anything, the proportion of farm labor being done
by women has been falling.
Furthermore, I will show that demographic variables indicate that there is little
likelihood that agriculture will be feminized in the future. I will use a multivariate
analysis to show that the presence of young females in households signiﬁcantly
decreases the proportion of farmwork being done by women in a household. The
presence of young men, in fact, has almost exactly the opposite effect, indicating
that young people of both sexes are ﬁnding or expecting to ﬁnd jobs off-farm. I
ﬁnd this trend in both data sets used for the analysis, indicating that it has existed
since at least 1994.
Besides debunking the idea that China’s agricultural labor force is being fem-
inized, the paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes
to the debate regarding women’s status in economic transition, and in particular
2the debate over women’s status in China’s transition. Several authors have stud-
ied women’s status in transition countries by examining gender wage gaps (e.g.
Brainerd, 2000; Maurer-Fazio and Hughes, 2002) or unemployment (Ham, Sve-
jnar, and Terrell, 1999). Second, the paper takes a unique perspective on gender
differences, by considering labor allocation across sectors rather than wage gaps
or labor force participation. By examining the role of women in one particular
sector, agriculture, the paper indirectly contributes to building evidence of robust
off-farm labor markets, regardless of gender, in rural China (e.g. Rozelle et al.,
1999, West and Zhao, 2000).
The paper will proceed as follows. First, I will provide a simple theoretical
model that is consistent with institutional features of the Chinese countryside and
discusses the conditions necessary for the feminization of agriculture in more de-
tail. Next, I will introduce the data set that I will use for the analysis, and describe
labor force trends found in the data regarding farm work. Fourth, I will perform a
multivariateanalysisonthedatatoexplainwhatfactorsinhouseholdsleadwomen
to do more of the farmwork in China. Using the analysis, I will conclude by de-
scribing the implications of this paper for the future of farming in China.
1 Modeling Agricultural Production and
Labor Supply in China
Since the decollectivization of agriculture in the early 1980s, also known as the
household responsibility system (HRS), individual households in rural China un-
dertake a vast majority of agricultural production (Putterman, 1993). Households
were left to make production decisions, including decisions about labor, and be-
came the residual claimant. The changes led to a signiﬁcant increase in grain
production despite a large decrease in the amount of labor in the cropping sector
(e.g. Lin, 1992). In part because every rural household initially received land in
the reform, agricultural labor markets are quite thin and households are primarily
dependent upon their own labor for production (Benjamin and Brandt, 2002).
Household agricultural production is therefore dependent on the amount of
land it receives from the village and the amount of labor it has available. Consider
a household that has been allocated an amount of land A and that has endow-
ments of male and female labor Lm and Lf, respectively.1 Initially, assume that
households face separate off-farm labor markets with market determined wages
1The model presented here is qualitatively similar to Rosenzweig (1980).
3for men and women (wm and wf). Therefore the household must determine how
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The interior solution to this problem is quite straight forward. The household
equates the marginal product of male farm labor with the male wage, the marginal
product of female farm labor with the female wage, and the marginal product
of capital with the rental rate. We are interested, though, in the proportion of









. If µ is increasing over time, then
the feminization of agriculture is occurring. By Cramer’s rule, it can be shown
that µ is increasing in the male wage (e.g.
∂µ
∂wm > 0) and decreasing in the female
wage (e.g.
∂µ
∂wf < 0). Therefore, if there are no constraints on off-farm entry, an
increase in the male (female) wage ceteris paribus would lead to a higher (lower)
proportion of agricultural labor done by females.
Corner solutions to this model are a distinct possibility, if the marginal prod-
uct of male labor on the farm is still below the wage when all male labor in a
household is allocated off-farm. Alternatively, the same could be true for females.
Either case is certainly a reasonable outcome, given that the marginal product of
labor on farm is reported to be much lower than prevailing wage rates (Cook,
1999). If each household has its own agricultural production function, it is likely
that some households will ﬁnd themselves allocating only male or female labor to
agriculture.
Given the institutional nature of farming in rural China, and the lack of em-
ployment opportunities in some areas, it is likely that some households face con-
straints on their off-farm labor market participation. The constraints might take
manydifferent forms. It couldbethat localoff-farm labormarketsare thinandmi-
grant networks non-existent, limiting off-farm labor market opportunities. House-
holds might have access to off-farm labor markets, but feel constrained to farm
4their land prior to working off-farm. Alternatively, households may have access
to distant labor markets but limit their participation because they are raising chil-
dren in the village.






i = m, f. The model is easier to solve in an alternative formulation, as a function
of off-farm labor:
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In this formulation of the model, it is interesting to think about the effect of the
relaxation of labor market constraints on the household’s farm labor mix. Assum-
ing that off-farm labor market participation for men and women is positive, the
household will choose male and female off-farm set the marginal product of farm
equal to the wage less the Lagrange multiplier λ on the constraint:
−FLi(·) + wm − λi = 0; i = m, f (3)
If the household is constrained in either male or female labor, then λm or λf is
positive, respectively. As the constraint for one gender relative to the other, the
amount of labor supplied off-farm by that gender will summarily increase, as with
the model based on wages (e.g.
∂Li
∂ e Li
> 0, i = m, f). Therefore, if women face
tighter constraints to entering off-farm labor markets, loosening that constraint for
women would lead to similar allocations of men and women to farm labor.
In summary, either external wages or constraints against off-farm labor may
be important factors leading households to allocate more labor from one gender
than the other to farming. The feminization of agriculture could be occurring in
a number of different ways. If off-farm wages for men and women are diverging,
then women may be taking over the farmwork. The same would be true if wages
were stagnant but constraints keeping men on the farm were loosening relative to
constraints for women. However, if wages are converging, or constraints loosen-
ing for women relative to men, one would expect that feminization of agriculture
is not occurring. To learn whether women are taking over farming in China, I turn
to household survey data.
52 Data
The data for this study come from two sources. The primary data set were col-
lected in a randomly selected, nearly nationally representative sample of 60 vil-
lages in 6 provinces of rural China during November and December of 2000
(henceforth, the China National Rural Survey– CNRS). The provinces are Hebei,
Liaoning, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Hubei, and Sichuan.2 To ensure broad coverage
within each province, one county was randomly selected from within each in-
come quintile for the province, as measured by the gross value of industrial out-
put. Two villages were randomly selected within each county. The survey teams
used village rosters and a census of households not included in the village’s list
of households to randomly choose the twenty households; both households with
their residency permits (hukou) in the village and those without. A total of 1199
households were surveyed.
The CNRS gathered information on household demographics, labor alloca-
tion, agricultural production, and non-farm activities. Several parts of the survey
were designed to learn about the household’s participation in labor markets over
time. For roughly half of the households surveyed (610 out of 1199), a twenty-
year employment history form was completed for each household member and
each child of the household head (even when they were no longer considered
“household members”). For each year between 1981 and 2000, the questionnaire
tracked each individuals participation in farm and off-farm employment, the main
type of off-farm work performed, the place of residence while working (within
or outside the village), the location of off-farm employment, and whether or not
each individual was self-employed or wage earning. All individuals who worked
were coded as either working on the farm full time, part time, only during the busy
season, or not working on the farm at all.
The CNRS also collected detailed information about the household members
on-farm work in 2000. After asking whether or not they worked on farm, each
household member was asked about the number of weeks they worked on the
farm during the busy and slack seasons, the number of days they worked in each
season, and the hours spent working on the farm on a typical day in each season.
By adding up the number of hours they worked overall in the busy and slack
2The data collection effort involved students from the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy,
Renmin University, and China Agricultural University. It was led by Loren Brandt of the Uni-
versity of Toronto, Scott Rozelle of the University of California at Davis, and Linxiu Zhang of
the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy. Households were paid 20 yuan and given a gift in
compensation for the time that they spent with the survey team.
6seasons, the number of hours each individual in the household worked on the
farm in 2000 can be calculated.3
The second data source that will be used in the paper are a sample of 787 farm
households from 31 villages in Hebei and Liaoning Provinces, collected in the
summer of 1995 (henceforth, the Dongbei data). As with the CNRS data, the sur-
vey gathered information on household and individual characteristics, household
wealth, agricultural production, and non-farm activities. The survey included a
module designed to elicit detailed information about the amount of work per-
formed by each household member on-farm, though the questions were asked
slightly differently, so the two raw measures are not comparable. In the Dongbei
survey, respondents were asked how many days they worked on the farm in the
peak season and how many days they worked on farm in the off-peak season dur-
ing the previous year. As with the CNRS, they were also asked to estimate the
number of hours they worked on an average day in the each season. Therefore,
a measure of the number of hours each individual within a household worked on
the farm in 1994 can be constructed.
3 The Proportion of Farmwork done by women in
China
In this section, I will describe patterns of farmwork in the CNRS data, both within
the household in 2000 and by household members between 1990 and 2000.4 After
describing the data in the cross-section, I will use the information in the cross-
sectional data and the employment history to construct household level measures
of the amount of farming done by women in the households in the sample. After
interpolating a trend, I will crosscheck the information using the subsample in the
CNRS collected in northeast China against the Dongbei data collected in 1995.
3Descriptive statistics for variables constructed from the CNRS are in Appendix Table 1.
4I also have employment history data on household members and children of the household
head between 1981 and 1989. I discard these data for two reasons. First, I do not have data on
household members who passed away prior to 2000. Therefore, as we go back in time, we lose
older household members who may have worked on the farm but have passed away, and this bias
grows as I go back further in time. Since men are more likely to continue farming in old age than
women in China, the measure of the proportion of farmwork done by women is biased slightly
upward, and the bias grows as I go back in time. Second, and perhaps more importantly, off-farm
work has increased dramatically since 1990, which may have changed the way choices regarding
farmwork are made.
7By computing the hours of farmwork done by each individual in 2000, we
can describe which demographic groups within households are farming, and the
intensity by which they are farming (Table 1). The data indicate that men are still
more likely to do farmwork than women. Whereas 70% of men in the sample
above the age of 16 work on the farm, only 65% of women do (rows 6 and 12).
However, women report working slightly more hours than men do on the farm;
on average, given doing any farmwork, women work 24 hours more than men in
a year on the farm.
Statistics describing the amount of farmwork done by cohort show that the
differences are particularly pronounced among certain age and gender cohorts.
Among the youngest cohort of the household labor force, both males and females
are much less likely than others to perform farm tasks, and they work less hours
when they do work on the farm. Women between 16 and 25 are even less likely
to work on the farm than men in the same age cohort– only 32.8% of women did
any farmwork, whereas 39.5% of men did (rows 1 and 7). Given participation in
farmwork, members of both groups did roughly 550 hours of work on average,
far below the sample average. Although some of these individuals were still in
school in 2000, they are turning in large numbers to off-farm work, and in fact
many migrate to ﬁnd work (de Brauw et al., 2002). Therefore, younger workers
are far less likely than other workers to perform farmwork, whether they are male
or female.
Although several authors have shown that men are working off-farm in much
larger numbers than women (e.g. Rozelle et al., 1999), the data show that among
all other demographic groups, men are only slightly less likely overall to have
worked on farm than women. These data conﬁrm that men between the ages of
26 and 55 are more likely than other workers to have off-farm jobs; 64% of them
work off-farm, whereas only 23% of women between 26 and 55 worked off-farm.
Nonetheless, men between 26 and 55 are only slightly less likely to have done
farmwork than women in the same demographic groups. Furthermore, they work
only slightly fewer hours on average than women do. For example, men between
36 and 45 years old work a mean of 860 hours on farm (row 3). Women between
36 and 45 work an average of 944 hours, or 9% more, and are only 5% more likely
to work on the farm.
Men over 55 are likely to make up any difference between farmwork done by
men and women, as they signiﬁcantly more likely to have worked on farm than
women. They work, on average, 45% more hours than women over 55, and are
30% more likely to have worked on farm (rows 5 and 11). Therefore, even though
men have moved off-farm in large numbers, these data indicate that they have
8not typically abandoned farmwork entirely to women; rather, they are typically
working off-farm part time and on farm part time. Meanwhile, older women tend
not to perform much farmwork at all.
To understand the difference between the effort expended farming by men
and women who do farm, I tabulate the data by the self-reported involvement in
farming in the employment history subsample (Table 2). Men who report working
only on the farm, on average, slightly more– just over 1000 hours per year– than
women who do not work off-farm (943 hours; row 1). Individuals who work part-
time on the farm sensibly work less hours than their counterparts who solely work
on the farm (row 2). Both men and women who work on the farm work similar
percentage of the hours of full time workers; part-time men average 70% of the
hoursthatfulltimemenwork, whereaspart-timewomenaverage64%ofthehours
of full-time women. Busy season farm workers work signiﬁcantly less hours, on
average, than part-time or full-time farm workers, and busy season women are
much less involved in farming than busy season men. Whereas busy season men
work 37% of the hours that full time men average, busy season women work only
20% of the hours of full-time women.
The employment history data can be used to create a measure of the proportion
of farmwork done by women in years prior to 2000. To do so, I estimate the
fraction of a full-time worker that a part-time or busy season worker represents,
by gender. Making some assumptions about these fractions, I can extrapolate the
percentage of farmwork done in each household by women back in time. First, I
assume that men and women work equal numbers of hours if they work full time
on the farm. If they work part-time on the farm, I assume that they are equivalent
to 2
3 of a full time worker, regardless of their gender. Finally, men who work
only in the busy season are assumed to be equivalent to 1
3 of a full-time worker,
whereas women who work only in the busy season are assumed to be equivalent
to 1
5 of a full-time worker, since they are found to have signiﬁcantly less farm
involvement in 2000. I further assume that the fractions do not change over time.
Byaggregatingthedatauptothehouseholdlevel, andmeasuringthepercentageof
each household’s farm workforce, I can estimate the mean percentage of women
involved in farming in each year between 1990 and 2000.5 Note that according to
the means in Table 2, the procedure will systematically overestimate the amount
women work on the farm, as full-time men work more hours in 2000 than full-
time women. However, the level is not important; the interest is in the trend. To
5Alternative assumptions regarding the proportions of full time farmers that part time and busy
season farmers represent led to similar results.
9generate a conﬁdence interval around the mean, each point was estimated using a
simple bootstrap 1000 times.
Figure 1 shows the estimated change in the proportion of the household farm
workforce that is female over time. I account for households that are formed
after 1990 and for members of the household alive in 2000 that leave or return
to the household. The data indicate that the amount of farmwork being done by
women is either level or increasing slightly between 1990 and 1995. Although
the proportion is likely overestimated, it indicates that women do roughly 54% of
the farmwork in the average household in 1995, which had increased from 53% in
1990. As the percentage of female members of the household over 16 is relatively
constant at 49% throughout the sample, these data would indicate that women
may have done slightly more than their share of farmwork over the early portion
of the data period.
However, beginningin1995theproportionoffarmworkbeingdonebywomen
begins to fall, dropping below 51% in 2000.6 A drop in the percentage of farm-
work being done by women, on average, is certainly not consistent with a story
that women are taking over the farmwork in rural China. Furthermore, a simple
regression of the mean percentage against a time trend gives a negative coefﬁcient
of −0.0015 with a t-ratio of 2.29. If the ﬁrst ﬁve points are excluded from the
regression, the coefﬁcient decreases to −0.0046 with a t-ratio of 5.44, which sug-
gests the amount of farmwork being done by women was decreasing each year
by almost a half percent between 1995 and 2000. In both cases, the coefﬁcient is
signiﬁcant at the 95% level. The observation that the percent of farmwork done
by women is falling is actually consistent with the nascent literature on off-farm
labor market trends in the late 1990s, which describe increasing off-farm opportu-
nities for women (de Brauw et al., 2002). If barriers to entry are falling for women
in off-farm work, it is consistent with the theoretical ﬁnding that the proportion of
farmwork done by women should decrease as constraints are weakened. Regard-
less, the retrospective data are not consistent with the story of the feminization of
agriculture.
There are two further potential sources of bias in Figure 1 related to the use of
retrospective data; however, neither of them are likely to affect the general ﬁnding
described above. The ﬁrst possible source of bias is difﬁcult to address convinc-
ingly, so I discuss it here. Because I use retrospective data related to employment,
6The estimated percentage in 2000 is about 3% higher than the average percent of farmwork
being done by women in the CNRS data, 48%, which may represent the systematic bias in my
calculation.
10the workers who have passed away since 1990 in households that have formed
are missed. In other words, I systematically underweight the elderly who work at
the beginning of the data, and the bias decreases over time. However, the bias is
not large. The NBS (1999) reports that nationally 10.3% of the population was
above “working age,” which they deﬁne as 60 and over for men and 55 and over
for women. In these data, 6.8% of the sample in 1990 ﬁts that deﬁnition of work-
ing age. Since older men on average do two and a half times the farmwork older
women do (Table 1), an upper bound on the bias would be 0.25, the difference be-
tween the average amount of farmwork done in the sample less the proportion of
farmwork done by women above working age, multiplied by the difference in the
above proportions, 0.035. Therefore, the bias may be as large as 0.875% in 1990,
and falling over time. However, it is likely that life expectancy is higher in urban
than rural areas, so the proportion of people over working age is likely lower in
rural areas. Furthermore, the people who have passed away by 2000 may have
systematically been less able to work in 1990 than those that did.7 The ﬁndings,
therefore, are likely to be robust to the aging of the sample.
To conﬁrm that women are doing less farmwork over the late 1990s, I com-
pare ﬁndings from the Dongbei data with the CNRS data collected in Hebei and
Liaoning provinces in 2000 (Table 3). Consistent with the observations from the
more nationally representative retrospective data, men are more likely to work on
the farm in Dongbei in 2000 than they were in 1994, whereas women are some-
what less likely to work on the farm (row 4). The most interesting differences
in participation rates are for women; both younger (16-25) and older (over 55)
women are less likely to work on the farm in northeast China in 2000 than they
were in 1995 (rows 1 and 3; columns 1 and 3). Meanwhile, men between 26 and
55 are over six percent more likely to work on the farm in 2000 than they were in
1994 (row 2, columns 2 and 4). Given an overall movement off the farm over the
late 1990s, the increase is surprising, but it could be due to massive layoffs that
began in state industry in the mid 1990s; northeast China has traditionally been
more industrialized and urban than the rest of China. Regardless, the data do not
show women doing more farmwork in 2000 than in 1994; if anything they show
women doing less farmwork.
Although demographic differences in farm labor participation between age
cohorts exist, the evidence is not as conclusive regarding the average amount
7The second potential bias relates to recall. As younger workers are more likely to work
off-farm, their parents may have answered questions related to their off-farm employment status
incorrectly. To control for this bias, I use the Dongbei data collected in 1994 as a check. Further
research on the magnitude of recall bias in rural China would be useful.
11of farmwork being done by women. Whereas 48.5% of farmwork was done by
women in 1994, in the CNRS I ﬁnd that on average 47.3% of farmwork was done
by women. Although the estimate is lower, the difference is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant, so I cannot conclude that women are actually doing less farmwork in
2000 than they were in 1994. However, it does not seem like they are doing more
farmwork either.
3.1 Are there outliers at the village level?
Although women’s participation in agriculture is not growing (and may be declin-
ing) in the aggregate, it could be that women are taking over agricultural produc-
tion in some areas of the country while leaving agriculture in others. For example,
it could be that women in poorer villages are taking over agricultural production
as men leave, while men and women are using capital to substitute from labor in
other areas of the country. There is, in fact, tremendous variation in the amount
of labor input into agriculture across the villages in the CNRS. In the richest vil-
lage in the sample (in Zhejiang), the average household farm reports 492 hours
into farming, whereas the average is 4280 hours in the most labor intensive vil-
lage in Sichuan.8 As there are ofﬁcially 700,000 villages in China and the CNRS
only surveyed 60 villages, even the presence of one outlier could represent a large
movement of women into farming in villages with similar characteristics. In this
subsection I will analyze trends at the village level.
If women are taking over farming in certain villages and not others, one would
expect that the proportion of farmwork done by women will exceed their share
in the village workforce by a signiﬁcant amount. To understand whether some
villages have such conditions, I simply plot the proportion of farm hours worked
by women against their share in the village workforce (Figure 2).9 The data show
that most villages have nearly a 1:1 correspondence between the proportion of
farm hours worked by women and their proportion of the workforce. Therefore
our descriptive ﬁndings above, that women are not doing an undue proportion of
the farmwork in most villages, is conﬁrmed.
8The average is 1955 hours.
9Deﬁning who is a member of the village workforce is not trivial. I deﬁne the village workforce
as anyone aged 16 and up, which certainly includes some students, and some people who do not
work due to health problems related to old age. I include migrants who have left the village in
the measure, because I model the decision to migrate as endogenous to the farmwork decision.
Excluding migrants or non-workers from Figure 2 do not signiﬁcantly affect the trend, nor change
the outliers.
12InonevillageinSichuanprovince, theproportionoffarmworkdonebywomen
exceeds their proportion of the workforce by more than ten percent (Figure 2–
SC1).10 There are two main reasons to believe that agriculture is not being unduly
feminized in that village. First, ﬁfteen percent of households in that village (3 of
20) had female household heads. In the remaining villages in the sample, only
three percent had female heads. As women can be expected to do more farmwork
in female headed households than other households, it is likely that the particular
sample has led to an overestimate. Second, there are two further households in
which women are reported to do well over 2000 hours of farmwork, which may
be an overestimate as well. When these two households are eliminated from the
sample, women do 53% of the farmwork on average, as opposed to 64% when all
households are aggregated. No other households share this feature, so it seems
that the large percentage of farmwork done by women is due to random factors,
rather than women systematically doing more farmwork than men.11
Although visually observing the trends can help us ﬁgure out whether or not
women are doing more farmwork than their share, a multivariate framework that
controls for demographic and provincial differences. To do so, I run a simple
regression:
µpv = αp + Ppvγ + Xpvβ + εpv (4)
where p indexes provinces and v indexes villages, Ppv represents the proportion
of women in the village labor force, Xpv represents the demographic composition
of the village, and εpv is an error term.12 The null hypothesis associated with the
feminization of agriculture is that γ = 1. To reject the hypothesis would indicate
that, on average, women are doing more than their share of farmwork. In estimat-
ing equation (4), I try two different deﬁnitions of Ppv– one using all household
members in the village labor force, and an alternative deﬁnition that excludes mi-
grants. Since migrants are more likely to be male in China (e.g. Zhao, 1999),
the second deﬁnition would seem more likely to yield a coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly
different than one.
10There is also an outlier village in Zhejiang in which women do a great deal less farmwork
than would be their share– I will neglect that village in the analysis.
11In other ways, the village workforce in village SC1 mirrors trends in the rest of the data. The
village has a high off-farm employment rate, and although men are more likely to work off-farm,
they are also almost as likely to do farmwork as women.
12I do not do the logistic transformation typically done for proportional variables on µpv, be-
cause the coefﬁcient estimate for γ would not be easily interpreted. I do the transformation for
household regressions.
13I only ﬁnd mild evidence that women are doing more farmwork than their
share, in one speciﬁcation of the model (Table 4). When I do not control for
provincial ﬁxed effects, and measure Ppv as the proportion of females in the whole
village workforce, I estimate that each percent that the female share of the labor
force grows, the amount of farmwork done by women increases by 2.09 percent
(column 1). The p-value on the F-test that γ = 1 is 0.16, indicating mild evidence
that women may do more farmwork than their share.
However, when I control for provincial differences using ﬁxed effects, and
perhaps more surprisingly, when I use the alternative deﬁnition for Ppv, I cannot
reject the null that γ = 1. The p-values on the F-test for γ = 1 are all greater than
0.5 (row 11, columns 2-4). The large point estimate for γ in column 1 appears
to result from a lack of provincial controls. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimates
for γ are actually smaller when using the second deﬁnition for the proportion
of workforce variable. A closer analysis of the migrant labor force in the sample
makes it less surprising, however. Whereas men are more likely to migrate for part
of the year, 43 percent of full year migrants are women.13 Therefore, subtracting
them from the village labor force does not affect the proportion of women in the
labor force a great deal. Regardless, it seems quite safe to conclude that women
are doing a share of farm labor close to their proportion in the labor force, at the
village level.
In summary, there is no empirical evidence at the village level that women do
more farmwork than their proportion in the labor force would indicate, and the
only outlier can be explained by random variation in the sample. Furthermore,
I cannot reject the null hypothesis that women work on the farm in the same
proportionasmen. Inthenextsection, Iwillexplainthevariationintheproportion
of hours worked on the farm at the household level, again controlling for a number
of factors, both using the CNRS and Dongbei data.
4 The Future of Household Farming, by Gender, in
China
Although the retrospective and cross-sectional analysis in the previous section
shows that agriculture is not being feminized in China, it does not control for
householdlevelfactorsthatmayaffecttheproportionoffarmworkdonebywomen.
In this section, I will analyze the determinants of the proportion of farmwork done
13Full year is deﬁned as nine months or more; most full year migrants only return for holidays.
14by women at the household level. In order to analyze the persistence of the re-
sults, after looking at the full CNRS sample I will compare the Northeast China
subsample with the Dongbei data.
To understand the determinants of the proportion of farmwork done by women
at the household level, I will regress the proportion at the household level µh on
the proportion of women in the household labor force Ph, a vector of household
characteristics Zh and a vector of demographic characteristics Xh:
µh = α + Phγ + Zhβ1 + Xhβ2 + εh (5)
Since the dependent variable in equation (5) is a proportion, predictions after
estimation may exceed the boundaries (0 and 1). Therefore I estimate it using






). Since women do no farmwork in about 10 percent of the sample and
all of the farmwork in about 6 percent of the sample, I use an estimating algorithm
that can deal with those observations.14
First, I use the CNRS cross sectional data to estimate equation (5) (Table 5).15
Both estimation procedures give the same general results; coefﬁcients have the
same signs and generally coefﬁcients on the same variables are signiﬁcant. Re-
ferring to the OLS estimate, the point estimate indicates that an increase of 10%
in the females in the household labor force leads to about a 7% increase in the
amount of farmwork done by women (column 1, row 1). The signs on coefﬁcients
on the household characteristics are sensible as well. I ﬁnd that women so more of
the farmwork when households are headed by females (row 2), while they do less
farmwork in households with more experienced, older heads (column 3). Women
are likely to do more farmwork in wealthier and more educated households, ce-
teris paribus (rows 4 and 6).
The most interesting coefﬁcient estimates are found on some of the demo-
graphic variables. The presence of 16 to 25 year olds in the household have sig-
niﬁcant effects on the proportion of farmwork done by women. This ﬁnding is
not in itself surprising; if farming was the major source of income for most house-
holds, we would expect the addition of a new male laborer to the household (upon
turning 16) to decrease the share of farming done by women, and the addition of
14The algorithm is contained in the GLM procedure in Stata.
15I include provincial level ﬁxed effects in estimating equation (5). The primary results are
robust to the inclusion of village ﬁxed effects. I use provincial ﬁxed effects in lieu of village level
effects to measure potential cultural differences in household organization across provinces.
15a female laborer to increase the share of farming done by women. In fact, I ﬁnd
exactly the opposite (rows 7 and 8).
Using the results from the logistic transformation, I created a hypothetical
household with parents between the ages of 46 and 55, at the mean level of all
other variables in the sample. The addition of a 16 to 25 year old male or female
to the household changes the percent of farmwork done by women by about 20
percent. Inotherwords, ifhalfofthehouseholdfarmworkwasdonebythewoman
without the child, 70 percent was done by the woman if the child was male and
30 percent was done if the child was female. The result was similar if a sibling
of the opposite sex also existed. The ﬁndings are consistent with a story that
robust off-farm labor markets are available to younger workers, and they seem
available to both men and women. Younger workers tend to be more educated,
an important factor in ﬁnding off-farm work in China (Yang, 1997). However, if
a gender wage gap existed, one would expect the presence of 16 to 25 year old
women to have a smaller effect on the proportion of farmwork done by women
than 16 to 25 year old men. The ﬁnding of coefﬁcients of opposite sign and almost
equal in magnitude implies that off-farm labor markets work for both young men
and women.
The second interesting ﬁnding regarding household demographics is that the
presence of older women in the household has a negative effect on the amount of
farmwork done by women. According to both speciﬁcations estimates, an addi-
tional woman over 55 in the household decreases the amount of farmwork done
by women (Table 5, row 15). However, the same is not true for men; the estimated
coefﬁcient on the men over 55 variable is positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant.
The ﬁnding can be explained as follows. When women reach older ages, they
either stop working altogether or shift their time into providing household goods.
Men do not stop working; rather, they continue to work in the ﬁelds. The ﬁnding
is consistent with research on labor allocation patterns among the elderly found
by other researchers (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2000).
4.1 Comparing 1994 with 2000 in Northeast China
To assess whether the same demographic trends were affecting household farm-
work allocations by gender in 1994 and 2000, I re-estimate equation (5) using the
subsample of the CNRS collected in Northeast China to compare directly with
the Dongbei data (Table 5). Many of the household characteristics have similar
effects on the proportion of farmwork done by women in 1994 and 2000. In both
samples, I ﬁnd that women do less farmwork in households with less experienced
16heads (row 3). Other coefﬁcients have similar signs, but are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant across both samples. For example, the coefﬁcient on the mean education
variable is positive and signiﬁcant in the 1994 data, but not in the 2000 subsam-
ple (row 6). However, it was signiﬁcant in the full CNRS sample, which can be
interpreted as a sign that women do more farmwork in more educated households
in both samples.
Several of the estimated coefﬁcients on demographic variables seem to indi-
cate different off-farm market conditions in Northeast China in 1994 than in 2000.
Speciﬁcally, thethree variablesmeasurethenumberof meninprimeworkingages
(between 26 and 55) have a positive, statistically signiﬁcant effect on the propor-
tion of farmwork done by women in 1994, whereas their point estimates are much
smaller in 2000, and they are largely statistically insigniﬁcant.16 These estimates
can be interpreted in the context of off-farm opportunities. If men’s wages were
much higher than women’s wages in 1994, we would expect to see their pres-
ence in a household increase the amount of farmwork done by women, as they
would allocate their labor off-farm. Alternatively, barriers to entry could restrict
women from working off-farm. The insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients in 2000 therefore
indicate that either women’s off-farm wages have risen with respect to men’s, or
that barriers to off-farm entry for women have fallen.
However, the coefﬁcients on the variables measuring the number of younger
workers in the household indicate similar effects in 1994 and 2000. The estimated
coefﬁcients for male and female laborers between ages 16 and 25 are similar in
1994 and 2000. Therefore, it seems that young men and women were already
leaving farmwork by 1994, and had similar barriers to entry, or a similar lack of
barriers. If panel data were available, one would see more than half of each cohort
move to the following cohort between 1994 and 2000. Therefore the ﬁnding, in
particular, that the number of males aged 26 to 35 have a signiﬁcant effect on
farmwork done by women in 1994 but not 2000 is not surprising, as many of the
women who were 16 to 25 in 1994 moved into the next cohort by 2000, and faced
similar constraints as men. However, as Table 1 shows, they are far more likely to
work on farm than they were when they were younger.17
In summary, I ﬁnd that the presence of younger men and women in house-
holds in rural China increase and decrease the share of farmwork done by women,
respectively. The point estimates for the two effects are of opposite sign and are
16Only the number of men between 36 and 45 have a statistically signiﬁcant effect in the tobit
speciﬁcation in 2000, and it is only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
17I also ﬁnd evidence that the presence of older men in the household increases the amount of
farmwork done by women in 1994, but not in 2000.
17of similar magnitude, which implies that men and women are equally likely to
leave the farm at a young age in China. Indirectly, the ﬁndings show a similar
lack of constraints to off-farm work for both men and women, or that wages for
young men and women are similar. Moreover, the ﬁndings are remarkably robust
to choosing a subsample and appear in the mid-1990s, indicating that gender has
not been a factor for off-farm employment, at least for young people, throughout
the late 1990s. The persistence of the results through time implies that younger
people in rural China will continue moving away from farming in the future.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have used household survey data to investigate whether or not
agriculture is being feminized in China. I have found almost no evidence to sup-
port a feminization hypothesis. Both an analysis of retrospective and village level
data do not suggest that women are doing an increasing proportion of farmwork
in China. In fact, if anything, the average amount of farmwork being done by
women is, if anything decreasing. This observation is consistent with descriptive
statistics from data collected in two Northeast provinces, Hebei and Liaoning, in
both 1994 and 2000.
From the perspective of an agricultural household in China, theoretically the
ﬁndings of the paper are consistent with either convergence in wages for men and
women off-farm, or with barriers to off-farm entry decreasing faster for women
than for men. The ﬁndings are consistent with the literature that claims such
barriers exist (e.g. Mallee, 2000), that men were signiﬁcantly more likely to work
off-farm in the early 1990s (e.g. Yang, 1997; Zhao, 1999), as well as the more
recent literature that shows women’s off-farm labor participation has increased
in the late 1990s (de Brauw et al., 2002). Indirectly, while showing that women
are not taking over the farmwork as reforms continue, I argue that the paper adds
to evidence that off-farm labor markets have begun to develop for both men and
women during the 1990s.
However, the ﬁndings do lead to another question. As households continue
to farm in rural China, if the women are not taking over farming, who is? There
are two potential answers to this question raised, but not discussed in detail, in
the paper. First, it could be that capital is substituting for labor. The theoretical
model developed in the paper can be used to show that both male and female
labor allocations to farming decrease as the relative price of capital decreases.
However, as discussed by Benjamin and Brandt (2002), empirically it is not clear
18how they use more capital. Do households purchase more capital? Do they rent
capital? Has it been allocated by the village? Further research would be necessary
to investigate the answers to these questions.
Second, older men could be taking over the farmwork. This hypothesis would
be supported in particular by Table 1, which shows that men over 55 in particular
participate in agriculture in much higher rates than older women, and they work
more when they do. If this hypothesis is correct, China’s policy makers should be
concerned about its farm sector in the long-term, as these men age and become
unable to work, while younger men and women do not begin farming. However,
it could be that capital is used more and more in some areas and not others, where
older men take over farmwork. Further research is necessary to explore these
hypotheses.
Finally, thispaper shows that if policymakers or development practitioners are
concerned about a feminization of agriculture, they should not rely on aggregate
data or descriptive analyses. It would be useful to study whether or not women are
taking over farmwork from a more disaggregated perspective in other economies
with different institutions than China as well. Such studies could help policy
makers and development practitioners better design policies to help rural areas in
the future.
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Figure 1: Estimated Proportion of Household Farm Labor Force that is Female,
1990 to 2000



























































Notes: Villages are plotted and named with two letters that represent the province name.
For example, ZJ is Zhejiang. The exceptions are Hebei (Heb) and Hubei (Hub).
Source: CNRS
Figure 2: Comparison of Amount of Farmwork done by Women with Proportion
of Workforce, Village Level, 2000
25Table 1: Farm Hours Worked and Percent of People Working on Farm, by demo-
graphic group, 2000
Demographic Group Percent Working Mean Hours Standard
on Farm in 2000 Deviation
Men aged:
16-25 39.5 550.8 523.5
26-35 76.5 792.9 677
36-45 86.7 860.7 696.1
46-55 90.3 891.9 697
over 55 69.2 832.6 665.5
All Men 70 803.3 671.9
Women aged:
16-25 32.8 543.7 533.9
26-35 81.2 849.2 684.9
36-45 91.2 944.1 698.5
46-55 86.0 911.1 688.6
over 55 40.4 574.9 503.2
All women 65 827.1 673.7
Notes: Means and standard deviations are measured only among individuals working on
farm. Sample size is 3794.
Source: CNRS.
26Table 2: Farm Hours Worked by Level of Involvement in Farming, by gender,
2000
Level of Involvement Men Women
Farm Work Only 1022.4 943.3
(682.7) (672.0)
Part-Time Farmer 711.9 598.6
(570) (555)
Busy Season Only 378.4 197
(408.9) (172.2)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Sample size is 1620, and only includes the
subsample for which employment history data is available.
Source: CNRS.
27Table 3: Participation in Farm Work by Age Cohort and Gender in Northeast
China, 1995 and 2000
Age Cohort Dongbei, 1994 CNRS, 2000
Women Men Women Men
16-25 46.4 49.4 40.2 49.2
26-55 85.1 80.2 87.5 86.8
over 55 41.7 65.4 34.7 66.4
overall 69.0 70.6 66.0 74.9
Notes: In the Dongbei data (columns 1-2), percentages are adjusted so that each village in
the sample receives the same weight, as in the CNRS data. The CNRS data (columns 3-4)
only include observations in Hebei and Liaoning provinces. Sample size in the Dongbei
data is 2384, and in the CNRS it is 1212.
Sources: Dongbei data set and CNRS.
28Table 4: Regressions Explaining the Percent of the Village Farm Workforce that
is Female in Rural China, 2000
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Workforce, 2.09 1.38 − −
Female (2.75)** (1.92)*
Percent Workforce, − − 0.78 0.75
Female, no migrants (1.77)* (1.89)*
Number of Men, 0.007 0.003 −0.004 −0.003
aged 16-25 (1.19) (0.48) (1.31) (1.35)
Number of Women, −0.02 −0.009 −0.003 −0.002
aged 16-25 (2.24)** (1.37) (0.72) (0.56)
Number of Men, 0.02 0.01 0.008 0.005
aged 26-55 (2.62)** (1.60) (1.47) (0.92)
Number of Women, −0.01 −0.004 0.002 0.003
aged 26-55 (1.40) (0.58) (0.35) (0.70)
Number of Men, 0.01 0.004 0.003 0.0002
over 55 (1.78)* (0.68) (0.61) (0.05)
Number of Women, −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.008
over 55 (2.71)** (1.66) (1.84)* (1.37)
Provincial Fixed
Effects? No Yes No Yes
Regression Statistics
R2 0.38 0.57 0.32 0.57
p-value, γ = 1 0.16 0.60 0.65 0.53
Notes: *- signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level; **- signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Source: CNRS.
29Table 5: Determinants of the Proportion of Farmwork Done by Women, 2000
Explanatory OLS Logistic
Variable (1) (2)
Proportion of 0.69 2.96
Labor, Female (8.11)** (6.10)**
Household Characteristics
Female Head 0.073 0.287
(1=yes) (1.82)* (1.69)*
Experience of −0.002 −0.007
Head (1.57) (2.14)**
Log, Household 0.015 0.066
Wealth (1.84)* (2.79)**
Responsibility −0.002 −0.009
Land (mu) (1.88)* (1.60)
Mean education, 0.009 0.038
household (years) (2.10)** (2.53)**
Household Demographics
Number males, 0.048 0.215
aged 16-25 (2.27)** (2.53)**
Number females, −0.054 −0.235
aged 16-25 (3.74)** (2.95)**
Number males, 0.014 0.067
aged 26-35 (0.53) (0.57)
Number females, 0.016 0.051
aged 26-35 (0.61) (0.43)
Number males, 0.038 0.194
aged 36-45 (1.81)* (1.52)
Number females, 0.042 0.147
aged 36-45 (1.40) (1.13)
Number males, −0.015 −0.038
aged 46-55 (0.63) (0.34)
Number females, 0.025 0.083
aged 46-55 (0.95) (0.68)
Number males, −0.001 0.016
over 55 (0.02) (0.15)
Number females, −0.060 −0.267




Notes: t-ratios in parentheses; standard errors calculated correcting for clustering at the village level.
*- signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level; **- signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Provincial ﬁxed effects
are included in all equations but not reported. Column (1) reports results using OLS, and column
(2) reports results after transforming the dependent variable using the logistic transformation.
Source: CNRS.
30Table 6: Determinants of the Proportion of Farmwork Done by Women, Northeast
China, 1994 and 2000
CNRS, Northeast China Dongbei data
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of 0.857 3.98 0.87 3.55
Labor, Female (4.45)** (3.97)** (7.91)** (6.87)**
Household Characteristics
Female Head 0.053 0.229 0.17 0.70
(1=yes) (0.56) (0.57) (3.81)** (3.75)**
Experience of −0.004 −0.023 −0.002 −0.010
Head (2.76)** (3.00)** (1.95)* (2.06)**
Log, Household 0.028 0.131 0.010 0.030
Wealth (2.62)** (2.76)** (0.75) (0.69)
Responsibility −0.002 −0.009 −0.001 −0.004
Land (mu) (1.01) (1.11) (1.62) (1.57)
Mean education, 0.006 0.016 0.013 0.052
household (years) (0.95) (0.59) (3.03)** (3.04)**
Household Demographics
Number males, 0.096 0.463 0.063 0.262
aged 16-25 (2.57)** (2.59)** (3.11)** (2.86)**
Number females, −0.070 −0.334 −0.087 −0.356
aged 16-25 (2.09)** (2.11)** (4.64)** (4.29)**
Number males, −0.014 −0.139 0.075 0.31
aged 26-35 (0.28) (0.55) (3.20)** (3.08)**
Number females, 0.033 0.137 −0.032 −0.141
aged 26-35 (0.66) (0.58) (0.99) (1.00)
Number males, 0.081 0.329 0.066 0.284
aged 36-45 (1.56) (1.33) (2.12)** (2.21)**
Number females, −0.003 −0.044 0.049 0.201
aged 36-45 (0.06) (0.18) (1.29) (1.27)
Number males, −0.031 −0.109 0.052 0.230
aged 46-55 (0.64) (0.48) (1.76)* (1.86)*
Number females, 0.015 0.054 0.010 0.041
aged 46-55 (0.30) (0.23) (0.33) (0.33)
Number males, 0.052 0.270 0.078 0.330
over 55 (1.20) (1.36) (2.61)** (2.60)**
Number females, −0.082 −0.389 −0.074 −0.305
over 55 (2.14)** (2.25)** (2.69)** (2.65)**
Summary Statistics
N 379 379 730 730
Adj. R2 0.247 0.194
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the village level. *- signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level; **- signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Results in column 3 are weighted so that each
village has the same weight in the regression. Provincial ﬁxed effects are included in all equations
but not reported.
Sources: CNRS (columns 1 and 2) and the Dongbei data set (columns 3 and 4).
31Appendix Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Proportion Farmwork, 0.474 0.251
done by Women
Household Characteristics
Proportion of Farm 0.485 0.146
Workforce, Women
Experience of 33.063 12.608
Head
Female Head 0.033 0.177
(1=yes)




Log, Household 6.92 1.492
Wealth (yuan)
Household Demographics
Number of Males, 0.399 0.604
aged 16-25
Number of Females, 0.366 0.599
aged 16-25
Number of Males, 0.305 0.475
aged 26-35
Number of Females, 0.279 0.458
aged 26-35
Number of Males, 0.314 0.47
aged 36-45
Number of Females, 0.352 0.478
aged 36-45
Number of Males, 0.312 0.472
aged 46-55
Number of Females, 0.274 0.446
aged 46-55
Number of Males, 0.281 0.464
over 55
Number of Females, 0.265 0.464
over 55
Notes: Sample size is 1199, except for the ﬁrst variable, which is 1131, because 68 house-
holds do not farm.
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